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The attempt to address the question of dif-
ference, within and between bodies, be-
comes an important theme in Merleau-
Ponty’s work at the time of The Visible and
the Invisible.1 Already in the Phenomenol-
ogy of Perception, there are indices pointing
to singular bodies and unique styles of exis-
tence—but these are hidden by the general
appeal of that text to the sameness of bodies,
and the exchangeability of experiences.2 As
the bearer of my zero-point of orientation in
space, my body and the other’s may repre-
sent exchangeable perspectives. But this
symmetry breaks down when the body is
seen as a temporality.3 This move begins in
the Phenomenology with the study of the
body’s expressivity. As the body’s expres-
sive and melodic character is emphasized,
Merleau-Ponty’s picture of the body be-
comes one of a singular, fluid becoming—
converging in the later works with Bergson’s
account of duration. Drawing on Bergsonian
ideas of duration and intuition, the later
Merleau-Ponty will find resources to con-
front the question of difference.
The Early Merleau-Ponty and the Body
as Expression
Rethinking the Temporality of the Lived Body
The body’s expressive powers are not re-
stricted to so-called personal acts, acts of
conscious will and choice. These powers can
be seen in the body’s sensory relation to the
world—so that every sensation, every expe-
rience of color and every movement of the
hand, expresses my whole existence as a sin-
gular becoming. In the chapter of the Phe-
nomenology of Perception entitled “Le
sentir,” the lived body’s experience of colors
and of tones is explored in terms of the reso-
nances and correspondences that the body
feels when in contact with the sensible. Ac-
cording to Merleau-Ponty, “blue is that
which [solicits] me to look in a certain way,
that which allows my gaze to run over it in a
specific manner” (PhP 210). Colors have a
vital significance that my body lives in its
own way.4 As do sounds: “within the musical
note a ‘micromelody’ can be picked out and
the interval heard is merely the final pattern-
ing of a certain tension felt throughout the
body” (PhP 211). My body appears here as a
particular tension or rhythm that responds to
the colors seen and the tones heard, that re-
plies to the sensible which is itself “a certain
rhythm of existence” (PhP 213). Thus the
lived body is a power [puissance] to syn-
chronize with its environment, to “reverber-
ate to all sounds, vibrate to all colours” (PhP,
236).5
This exploration of le sentir as resonance
and rhythm is brought to light by a “radical
reflection” according to Merleau-Ponty. In
such reflection, “I must be particularly care-
ful not to begin by defining the senses; I must
instead resume contact with the sensory life
[la sensorialité] which I live from within”
(PhP, 219–20). This is then a different meth-
odology from the one that takes its point of
departure in the fully constituted body of
“natural perception” (PhP, 225). There is a
move in this chapter of the Phenomenology
to explore sensation below the presumptive
unities of perceiving subject and perceived
world. And although Merleau-Ponty opts at
the end of the chapter to return to “a natural
attitude of vision” and a unified perception,
the first part of “Le sentir” follows the route
of sensations and “break[s] this total
structuralization of vision” (PhP, 227). This
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radical reflection can be seen again in the
painter’s vision in L’Œil et l’Esprit, and in
the method of hyper-reflection presented in
The Visible and the Invisible.6 In both cases
we find it opposed to a kind of “profane” or
natural vision that aims at recognition—that
cuts the world up into solids which can be
categorized and identified, which can be eas-
ily managed. The study of sensation tends to
bracket this natural vision; it provides a dif-
ferent framework for conceiving the body’s
unity and its relation to the world and to oth-
ers. This is the framework we are interested
in exploring in this essay.
What the above examples of resonances
to colors and sounds show is the intertwining
of sensing and sensible that characterizes le
sentir for Merleau-Ponty. Sensation is not an
atomistic or material content; Merleau-
Ponty had already rejected the “sensations”
of empiricism at the beginning of the Phe-
nomenology. In the chapter on “Le sentir,”
sensation becomes the site of an encounter,
and the temporality of the body of sensations
is marked by this encounter. At first view, the
encounter that is found in sensation seems to
be that of subject and object. But the diffi-
culty of sensation is in describing an encoun-
ter that has always already taken place, i.e.,
an encounter on the level of affective life.7
For it is not a fully constituted subject that is
confronted with a determinate world; rather
both subject and object, sensing and sensi-
ble, are constituted through the process of
sensation—which puts their independence
and their separation along lines of activity
and passivity into question. To borrow from
Gilles Deleuze in Francis Bacon: The Logic
of Sensation:
One face of sensation is turned toward the
subject (the nervous system, vital move-
ment, “instinct,” “temperament” . . . ); the
other face is turned toward the object (“the
fact,” the place, the event). Or rather sensa-
tion has no faces at all, it is indissolubly
both things, it is being-in-the-world, in the
phenomenological sense. At the same
time, I become in sensation, and something
happens through sensation, one through
the other, and one in the other.8
The temporality of the expressive, lived
body can be understood by studying the en-
counter through which sensation occurs. By
developing Merleau-Ponty’s hints in the
chapter on “Le sentir,” we find that sensation
is a process of waiting, beckoning, and re-
sponse. The initial moment of sensation in-
volves, according to Merleau-Ponty, an
openness of the body to the world. Hence, “I
lend my ear or I look awaiting a sensation,
and suddenly the sensible takes hold of my
ear or my gaze, and I give over a part of my
body, even my whole body, to this particular
manner of vibrating and filling space that is
the blue or the red” (PhP, 212; my transla-
tion). This waiting is not lived passively on
the part of the body; it is not a static posture.
There are preparatory movements of the
body, “nascent movements” that recall
Husserl’s kinaestheses (PhP, 209); they rep-
resent the body’s attempts to take a hold on
the world, to lend the world form from its
own being. These virtual movements, as yet
“incipient” and barely conscious, are put in
motion by the world, and develop into the
body’s particular motor responses to the blue
or the red. For its part, the sensible world
does not simply take over my body; it beck-
ons to it and negotiates with it. As Merleau-
Ponty says, “before my body synchronizes
with it, the sensible is nothing but a vague
beckoning. . . . Thus the sensible which is on
the point of being sensed sets a confused
problem for my body to solve. I must find the
attitude that will provide it with the means of
becoming determinate, of becoming blue; I
must find the response to a badly formulated
question” (PhP, 214; my translation). Hence,
waiting and openness on my part, and a
beckoning on the part of the world—all this
before the blue has been seen, or the object
recognized as blue (PhP, 211). The explicit
moment of sensing then comes in the form of
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a bodily response, in finding the singular
rhythm and pattern of movements that can
resonate to that aspect of the world and that
allows me to see blue.9 It is not every attitude
of the body that can synchronize with and
express blue; there is an experience of inter-
ruption and hesitation at the sensory level
which can arise, “if a subject tries to experi-
ence a specific color, blue for example, while
trying to take up the bodily attitude appropri-
ate to red, an inner conflict results, a sort of
spasm” (PhP, 214, citing Werner).
This structure of sensation as openness
and response points to its open temporality.
That sensation is a response means that it is
adapted in each instance to the problem, to
the call that is addressed to it from the world.
And in each case, this response is a singular
one. We must conclude, from Merleau-
Ponty’s account, that sensation is a becom-
ing, in which both body and world partici-
pate. The world finds expression, becomes
sensible and takes form in sounds and colors.
And the body finds the rhythm, the virtual
movements or style, that express its own ex-
istence while allowing it to sense such a
world.10
This power of sensation to express and re-
verberate the features of the sensible world is
not an anonymous one; for sensations are in-
scribed as “moment[s] of my individual his-
tory” (PhP, 215). It is precisely in its duration
that the expressive body of sensations is of
interest to us; for this duration reveals itself
as open and unforeseeable. As we have seen,
sensation cannot be thought as an instanta-
neous or isolated datum; it is rather an expe-
rience that evolves and changes as it goes on.
When we try to maintain the experience of a
single sensation, our experiment fails; for we
find the sensation to be unstable, and to give
rise to a multiplicity of other sensations that
we did not foresee in the original. Merleau-
Ponty notes,
If a given area of the skin is several times
stimulated with a hair, the first perceptions
are clearly distinguished and localized
each time at the same point. As the stimu-
lus is repeated, the localization becomes
less precise, perception widens in space,
while at the same time the sensation ceases
to be specific: it is no longer a contact, but a
feeling of burning, at one moment cold and
at the next hot. Later still the patient thinks
the stimulus is moving and describing a
circle on his skin. Finally nothing more is
felt. (PhP 75)
It is in this sense that sensation can be seen as
a “dynamic repetition” (to use Deleuze’s
term from Difference and Repetition); for a
sensation is only the “same” by becoming
different, by evolving according to an inter-
nal dynamic, an internal difference, that de-
fines it as a temporal being.11 Sensations are
becomings which impart to the lived body a
duration that is directed to the future; this
body is thus susceptible to all the experi-
ences that such an openness to the future im-
plies—to waiting, synchronization, hesita-
tion, and wonder.
The expressive powers of the body trans-
late correspondences not only between body
and world, but also between the different
senses within the body. Sensations thus reso-
nate and express one another. This is the case
of synaesthetic experience, where the limits
between the senses become porous, and one
comes to see sounds, and to hear colors (PhP
229).12 This experience cannot be reduced to
the mere coexistence of two sensations, one
auditory and the other visual. Rather, there is
an evolution and differentiation of sensation
through the body—the auditory becoming
visual, and color becoming sound—where
their envelopment prevents any analysis into
discrete parts.13 According to Merleau-
Ponty, “when I say that I see a sound, I mean
that I echo the vibration of the sound with my
whole sensory being, and particularly with
that sector of myself which is susceptible to
colours” (PhP, 234). This is only possible if
the sound is not merely a physical quality,
and the eyes are not fully determinate or-
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gans. The sound is a particular rhythm of the
material world that affects my whole body,
and my eyes are themselves rhythms that ex-
press my existence through their virtual
movements (or kinaestheses). It is by means
of these virtual movements that my eyes re-
spond to the world, and it is by modulating
these movements that they are able to echo
and express the visible and invisible rhythms
of that world. In the context of synaesthesia,
sensation no longer resembles the object
sensed, nor can it be circumscribed within
objective fields of sense. The sensations of
synaesthetic experience do not fit into prior
categories or models; they are singular affec-
tive and dynamic responses—becomings
that give to our experience the novel and un-
predictable openness of duration.
It should be noted that it is in the descrip-
tions of synaesthetic experience that Gilles
Deleuze finds resources for his own theory
of sensation. And it is in this context that
Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty are closest.14
For Deleuze sees each sensation as a dy-
namic evolution; “sensation is that which
passes from one ‘order’ to another, from one
‘level’ to another.” This means that “each
sensation is at diverse levels, of different or-
ders or in several domains. . . . It is character-
istic of sensation to encompass a constitutive
difference of level and a plurality of consti-
tuting domains.”15 What this means for
Deleuze is that sensation cannot be isolated
in a particular field of sense; these fields
interpenetrate, so that sensation jumps from
one domain to another, becoming-color in
the visual field or becoming-music on the
auditory level. For Deleuze (and this goes
beyond what Merleau-Ponty explicitly
says), sensation can flow from one field to
another, because it belongs to a vital rhythm
which subtends these fields, or more pre-
cisely, which gives rise to the different fields
of sense as it contracts and expands, as it
moves between different levels of tension
and dilation.16
If as Merleau-Ponty says (and Deleuze
concurs), “synaesthetic perception is the
rule” (PhP, 229), then the act of recognition
that identifies each sensation with a determi-
nate quality or “sense,” and operates their
synthesis within the unity of an object, hides
from us the complexity of perception, and
the heterogeneity of the perceiving body.
Synaesthesia shows that the unity of the
body is constituted in the transversal com-
munication of the senses. But these senses
are not pregiven in the body; they correspond
to sensations that move between levels of
bodily energy—finding different expression
in each. To each of these levels corresponds a
particular way of living space and time;
hence the simultaneity in depth that is expe-
rienced in vision is not the lateral coexis-
tence of touch, and the continuous, sensuous
and overlapping extension of touch is lost in
the expansion of vision (cf. PhP, 224).17 This
heterogeneous multiplicity of levels, or
senses, is open to communication; each ex-
presses my embodiment in its own way, and
each expresses differently the contents of the
other senses (with no complete translation
possible).
Thus sensation [le sentir] is not a causal
process, but the communication and syn-
chronization of the “senses” within my body,
and of my body with the sensible world; it is,
as Merleau-Ponty says, a “communion”
(PhP, 212). And despite Merleau-Ponty’s
frequent appeal in the Phenomenology of
Perception to the sameness of the body and
to a “common world” to ground the diversity
of experience, the appeal here goes in a dif-
ferent direction. It is the differences of
rhythm and of becoming, which characterize
the sensible world, that open it up to my ex-
perience. For the expressive body is itself
such a rhythm, capable of synchronizing and
coexisting with the others. And Merleau-
Ponty refers to this relation between the
body and the world as one of sympathy.18
Merleau-Ponty is close here to identifying
the lived body with a temporalization of ex-
istence, with a particular rhythm of duration;
and he is close to conceiving the world as the
coexistence of such temporalizations, such
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rhythms. (But this move cannot be explicitly
made until The Visible and the Invisible in-
troduces the concept of the flesh as a fabric
of durations, that is, until Merleau-Ponty has
found the proper framework for conceiving
duration.)
In the Phenomenology of Perception,
Merleau-Ponty refers to this rhythm of my
body as its unique and singular style. Like
the melody and the work of art, my body has
its own style, its own ways of living time and
space—which is, for Merleau-Ponty, its dy-
namic corporeal schema.19 The style of the
body, the unique manner of being that it ex-
presses, is inseparable from the body itself,
and is contained in every aspect of the body,
in each sensation, action and gesture; for the
parts of the body, like those of the melody,
are not simply juxtaposed, but envelop one
another (PhP, 149). As Merleau-Ponty says
elsewhere, “all perception, all action which
presupposes it, and in short every human use
of the body is already primordial expres-
sion.”20 Already in the Phenomenology of
Perception, not only bodily gestures but also
linguistic ones are seen to stem from the ex-
pressive power of the lived body. Hence, “the
smile, the relaxed face, gaiety of gesture re-
ally have in them the rhythm of action, the
mode of being in the world which are joy it-
self” (PhP, 186). And when it comes to
words, they are “several ways for the human
body to sing the world’s praises and in the
last resort to live it” (PhP, 187).
The expressivity of the lived body implies
a singular relation to others, and a different
kind of intercorporeity than would be the
case for two merely physical bodies. This
intercorporeity, I think, should be under-
stood as an inter-temporality. And Merleau-
Ponty seems to propose this at the end of the
chapter on temporality in the Phenomenol-
ogy of Perception: “But two temporalities
are not mutually exclusive as are two
consciousnesses, because each one knows it-
self only by projecting itself into the present
where they can interweave” (PhP, 433).21
Thus our bodies as different rhythms of du-
ration can coexist and communicate, can
synchronize to each other—in the same way
that my body vibrated to the colours of the
sensible world. But in the case of two lived
bodies, the synchronization occurs on both
sides22—with the result that I can experience
an internal resonance with the other when
our experiences harmonize, or the shattering
disappointment of a miscommunication
when the attempts fail.23 The experience of
coexistence is hence not a guarantee of com-
munication or understanding; for this com-
munication must ultimately be based on our
differences as expressive bodies and singular
durations. Our coexistence calls forth an ef-
fort (for which Merleau-Ponty in the Phe-
nomenology has not yet found a name, but
which I will call intuition).
The Turn to Bergson in the Later
Merleau-Ponty
The Intuition of Difference
Ultimately the question of difference,
within and between bodies, could not be ade-
quately addressed within the framework of
the Phenomenology of Perception. The in-
completeness of the phenomenological re-
duction (which Merleau-Ponty discusses in
the preface to the Phenomenology) pointed
to difference—to singular becomings and
concrete durations that fell through its
nets—but ultimately this was only a negative
discovery. The incompleteness of the reduc-
tion, whether phenomenological or eidetic,
comes to indicate for the later Merleau-
Ponty a serious flaw in the aim and method-
ology of phenomenology as a philosophy of
essences. The problem is twofold: eidetic in-
tuition attempts to grasp the thing and the
world as absolute, formalized, and constant
positivities (whereas there is no stable es-
sence within the stream of becoming); its
method is based on the spectator-philoso-
pher taking a point of view outside the thing
and the world, soaring over them, in order to
be able to infinitely vary their structures
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(whereas in order to see it, the philosopher
must be “of” the world).24 What Merleau-
Ponty seeks after the Phenomenology is a
positive method for understanding differ-
ence. The response—already implied in the
Phenomenology’s descriptions of the ex-
pressive body (though not yet made system-
atic in that text)—consists in adopting a tem-
poral framework, in conceiving the lived
body as duration and as rhythm of becoming.
Thus we witness in Merleau-Ponty’s later
work an abandonment of the framework of
the Phenomenology, and of the sameness of
the “perceived world” as a basis for experi-
ence.
25 It is the appeal to a philosophy of ex-
pression, in the guise of Bergsonism, that
takes its place.26
Instead of the earlier, almost exclusively
critical treatment of the Phenomenology, in
The Visible and the Invisible as well as in La
Nature,27 Merleau-Ponty finds in Bergson an
ally, offering a counterpart to, and a recon-
figuration of, the Husserlian influence that
continues to be felt in his work. Notably, it is
from Bergsonism that Merleau-Ponty bor-
rows the tools with which to criticize eidetic
phenomenology as a “philosophy of es-
sences” or representation (or, to borrow a
term from Irigaray, a “logic of solids”). This
critique should not, however, be construed as
a break with Husserl, but as an attempt to
read Bergson and Husserl together.28 As
Merleau-Ponty says,
Through Bergsonism as through Husserl’s
career we can follow the laborious process
which gradually sets intuition in motion,
changes the positive notation of ‘immedi-
ate data’ into a dialectic of time and the in-
tuition of essences into a ‘phenomenology
of genesis,’ and links together in a living
unity the contrasting dimensions of a time
which is ultimately coextensive with be-
ing. (Signs, 156)
The turn to Bergson hence marks
Merleau-Ponty’s move away from the phi-
losophy of essences, and the appeal to invari-
ant structures; it represents an attempt to sit-
uate himself squarely within genetic phe-
nomenology, which sees being “from
within.” Merleau-Ponty is not only allied
with Bergson in his later work, but he has
also moved closer to the framework of
Husserl’s Analyses Concerning Passive Syn-
thesis, and to the affective and temporalizing
picture of subjectivity found therein.29 In-
stead of initiating the study of the body and
of being with perceived objects already
given to consciousness and unified percep-
tual acts, Merleau-Ponty searches in The Vis-
ible and the Invisible for the pre-objective
(and pre-subjective) affective ground that
links the body to the world, and that gives
rise to both. At the same time, the world is
not seen as one ready-made, but as a tapestry
of colors, textures and sounds, as a relief that
attracts the lived body before being
objectivated, a system of diacritical differ-
ences rather than isolated and solidified
things.30
How then is the critique of the philosophy
of essence articulated in Merleau-Ponty’s
later work? Repeating Bergson’s argument
from L’évolution créatrice, Merleau-Ponty
points out that the philosophy of essences
arises when experience is thought against the
possibility of nothingness.31 Only “the abso-
lutely hard being of the essence” (VI, 120) is
then seen to sufficiently resist the radical
contingency that threatens being, and to fill
the emptiness that is posited behind the exis-
tence of the world.32 But this idea of an abso-
lute nothingness is itself an illusion accord-
ing to Bergson; for negation is only ever
partial, and arises when an expectation is dis-
appointed, when in searching for something
we are confronted with its absence.33 Ulti-
mately, eidetic intuition determines in ad-
vance the responses it will find, excluding
thereby that which is fluid, variable and un-
foreseeable.34
In replacing the Husserlian intuition of es-
sences with Bergsonian intuition, Merleau-
Ponty aims to circumvent the philosophies
of soaring over and of essence, and to create
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a philosophy that installs itself in the fluidity
of being, in the stream of becoming, and that
sees it “from within.”35 This method of intu-
ition provides Merleau-Ponty with the basis
for a philosophy of difference, which is also
a philosophy of intersubjectivity; for
Bergson shows that “our relationship to the
true passes through others”36 (IPP, 31). De-
spite some hesitations on Merleau-Ponty’s
part,37 his closeness to Bergson can be traced
through the later works—where he comes to
read Bergson as offering a new reduction and
a new phenomenology, while at the same
time he himself becomes more Bergsonian.38
In its critical aspect, intuition functions
much like a reduction, bracketing theories
(such as the philosophy of essences or sol-
ids) that are interposed between us and be-
ing. The positive side of this “Bergsonian re-
duction” is in opening to us a being that is
duration and difference—in teaching us to
see sub specie durationis.39 Through intu-
ition, being is seen as fluidity and becoming,
and we are able to discern the lines of expres-
sion and differentiation, to witness “la
création continue d’imprévisible nouveauté
qui semble se poursuivre dans l’univers.”40
Intuition is hence “an apprenticeship in a
general way of seeing” (Signs, 184)—not
the static vision that soars over being in order
to exhaust its secrets, but a vision that does
not detach itself from what it sees, that is “of
it,” and that thus accompanies the flow of be-
ing rather than seeking to arrest it.41 This vi-
sion sees the fluid intervals, rather than the
stoppages, according to Bergson. In this
sense, intuition should be understood as a
process without a teleology, as “an indefinite
series of acts”;42 for there is no end-state of
duration, no single direction that intuition
can follow, and no point at which its efforts
can achieve rest.43 Hence this vision sub spe-
cie durationis is more than mere sight; it is an
effort that proceeds in several directions, and
at several levels, at once—closer to the
synaesthetic resonance of which we spoke in
the context of the expressive body. Intuition
is described by Bergson as “auscultation
spirituelle,”44 taken up by Merleau-Ponty “as
auscultation or palpation in depth.”45 It is re-
vealed as an at tent ive and pat ient
attunement, which is not a state of passivity,
but an active effort of attention.
Merleau-Ponty is careful to observe that
this vision and palpation of being from
within is not a fusion—that despite occa-
sional claims of coincidence with things,
such coincidence can only be “partial” for
Bergson (VI, 122).46 This failure of coinci-
dence stems from the character of duration
itself; like one’s body, one’s own duration is
only asymmetrically given. We are too close
to our duration; we cannot leave the flow in
order to encompass it, for there is no point of
view exterior to time that would allow us to
encircle it, and to choose a perspective upon
it.47 This is to say that my duration flows and
carries me irreversibly with it—that the ex-
perience of time is not only of my own mo-
bility, but of something that overflows and
transcends me. Ultimately, it is the very im-
mediacy of my contact with duration that
prevents me from stepping back from it, and
that determines this contact as “partial.”48
As with my own duration, the experience
of other durations cannot be that of a coinci-
dence. It is rather, as Merleau-Ponty says, “a
lateral relationship of coexistence” (IPP, 15).
My own duration is in contact with others;
my duration gives me access to other people,
to living beings, and to the universe as a
whole—not according to the schema of sub-
ject and object, but as different rhythms and
tensions of duration that are linked inter-
nally. The ground of this coexistence is to be
found in the nature of duration itself.49 For
durations do not border each other exter-
nally, but are virtually implicated in one an-
other—each duration containing within it-
self the trace or memory of other levels.50 In
this sense, I am not only within duration, but
other durations haunt me from within (IPP,
15), so that I experience my own duration as
“a choice among an infinity of possible dura-
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tions.”51 These durations are available to me
through intuition; through a dilation or con-
traction of my own rhythm in a violent effort
to transcend myself, I may resonate with
other levels and other rhythms of duration
(not unlike the internal resonances that the
lived body feels in relation to colors).52 Intu-
ition hence involves a leap, a departure from
oneself in order to adapt to the rhythm of an-
other; Bergson compares this method to
learning how to swim, since no formula
could prepare us for the experience of swim-
ming, and no theory could give us in advance
our experience of coexisting with the other.53
This leap does not, however, occur without
practical preparation, and intuition “is far
from being . . . an inspired fact which is diffi-
cult to verify” (Signs, 187), for intuition re-
quires a long process of “camaraderie” with
the other, of study and analysis which is in-
dispensable even in the case of one’s own du-
ration (though intuition cannot be reduced to
this analysis).54 This is because intuition is
not a vague contact with the other or with the
universe, but an active discernment and
attunement, a difficult effort to find and to
resonate to the level of another duration. It
should be noted that this attunement can take
different forms: it may be the experience of
walking to another’s pace, or of adapting to
another’s style of conversation. It may be an
attunement to the rhythm of someone else’s
thought. In a different context, we find the
aesthetic experience of the artist with the
landscape, or the ecologist with the environ-
ment.55
Duration is not a purely interior experi-
ence, but opens me to other durations, the in-
tuition of which goes beyond my own expe-
rience. Intuition is a sympathy—one that
does not take the self as its point of reference,
since both self and other are inscribed in the
intersecting fabric of duration.56 In my view,
this interpenetration of durations, this inter-
or intra-temporality, forms the flesh for
Merleau-Ponty. The flesh is a virtual multi-
plicity and coexistence of durations. It is “a
relief of the simultaneous and the successive,
a spatial and temporal pulp where the indi-
viduals are formed by differentiation” (VI,
114) . This f lesh makes possible
intercorporeity and intersubjectivity; at a
more basic level, it is this flesh which is re-
vealed in the simple experience of waiting
for the sugar in the glass of water to dis-
solve.57
For Merleau-Ponty, the experience of in-
tuition must be a bodily intuition, a “commu-
nion” in the flesh. This would seem to extend
intuition beyond Bergson’s own formula-
tions, but some hints for this move can al-
ready be found within Bergsonism. For dif-
ferent durations produce not only different
rhythms of existence, but different bodies
and styles of being in the world.58 This brings
us back to the expressive body of the Phe-
nomenology of Perception, the body that res-
onated with colors, and vibrated to sounds in
an internal relation that was already the co-
existence of rhythms in the flesh. It is this
body that is elucidated once Merleau-Ponty
adopts the method of intuition, and through
the Bergsonian framework of his later work.
Conclusion
My purpose has been to present a theory
of sensation that enables a more productive
account of the lived body, temporality, and
intercorporeity. In so doing I have made ex-
plicit an image that characterizes the body
for Merleau-Ponty, that of rhythm. The ap-
peal to rhythm should not be taken as another
formalism imposed upon the body, as a limi-
tation of the body to a particular shape or
harmonics. Bodily rhythms are temporal
flows and fluid becomings. As such, they can
become arrhythmic and turbulent, as well as
ordered and harmonious. Differences of
bodily rhythm do not simply mark a change
of degree, a change of speed or tempo, that
would leave the moments of the rhythm in-
tact; such differences are experienced as dif-
ferences in kind.59 One cannot maintain the
same style of moving, of walking for in-
stance, while speeding it up; it is a different,
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rushed manner of moving in the world that
comes to view. The differences between
bodily rhythms are hence not differences
that can be measured or defined in a formula,
and the evolution of these rhythms is not a
transformation that can be predicted before-
hand; it is a genuine heterogeneity, a qualita-
tive differentiation which defines a singular
style of embodiment. The communication
between rhythms is thus not a matter of de-
tached analysis, but a resonance that can be
called bodily intuition.
Although the idea of the body as rhythm
remains at the level of a metaphor in the Phe-
nomenology of Perception, some more re-
cent theories of the body can be seen to take
this notion seriously—extending it beyond
Merleau-Ponty and beyond what is
phenomenologically recognizable as a lived
body. Hence, at the l imit of the
phenomenological body, Deleuze develops
the concept of a “Body without Organs.”60
This body, which is more rhythm or wave
than organic form, shows us a body that is
defined only by vital rhythms and lines of
force. The “Body without Organs” is not de-
fined by the absence of all organs; it is not an
amorphous matter. Rather this body is char-
acterized by indeterminate and temporary
organs—fleeting and changing organs that
fulfill a need, embody a desire or sense a par-
ticular aspect of the world—according to the
undulating rhythm that traverses the body
and the forces that act upon it.61
It is interesting to note, given Deleuze’s
closeness to Bergson, that Deleuze also
chooses to compare the encounter with the
other to the experience of learning how to
swim. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze
remarks that the movements of the swimmer
do not resemble those of the wave, nor is
such imitation conducive to swimming. In
swimming “a body combines some of its dis-
tinctive points with those of a wave, it es-
pouses the principle of a repetition which is
no longer that of the same, but involves the
other—involves difference, from one wave
and one gesture to another.”62 This bodily
attunement, which is not a coincidence with
the other but a resonance, is what we have
meant by bodily intuition.
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